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ABSTRACT 
Sook Ching is a Chinese term meaning “purge through cleansing.” Operation Sook Ching 
took place in Singapore from February 21 to March 4, 1942. It was a military operation 
carried out by the Japanese with the intent of executing anti-Japanese Chinese men 
between the ages of 18 and 50. Ultimately, it is impossible to know exactly how many 
people were killed; the official Japanese figure is 5,000, while unofficial estimates reach 
as high as 50,000. Men were called into screening centers where disorganized screening 
procedures determined if they were anti-Japanese. The Sook Ching’s legacy lives on as 
one of the greatest tragedies in Singapore’s history. 
The intent of this paper is to argue for a redefinition of the Sook Ching as a genocide 
rather than a massacre. The cornerstones of this research are the United Nations’ 
Genocide Convention and contemporary sources discussing the crime. This research is 
important because it sets a precedent of accountability, as well as acknowledging the 
crimes the Japanese committed during the Second World War. This thesis will discuss the 
Sook Ching, its legacy, and the steps required to address the incident and right the 
wrongs that occurred. It will also examine the racial and political environment that set 
the stage for the tragedy, as well as the scars it left behind. 
 
On February 3, 1942, artillery shells reached Singapore from Johore, part of modern day 
Malaysia.1 I  a  he begi i g f he e d. Si ga e a  B i ai  he    he 
Malay peninsula and was considered almost impenetrably secure. This hubris would ultimately 
hurt residents; many shores were defenseless, as Arthur Percival, Lieutenant-General in charge 
of the island, believed reinforcing them would only harm morale.2 When members of the British 
army realized they would likely lose the city, panic broke out. Many abandoned their uniforms 
and disguised themselves as civilians to avoid capture, while members of the Chinese Mobilisation 
Council, a local volunteer force, haphazardly sewed new ones to take up the flag and fight to their 
deaths in the northeastern suburb of Kranji.3 On February 14, Japanese forces reached Alexandra 
Hospital in southern Singapore. Claiming that they had seen British sniper fire, they entered the 
operating theatre and killed everyone inside. Over 200 staff and patients died.4 After this, chaos 
reigned. When families tried to escape the oncoming Japanese, they were met with unfought fires, 
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bomb craters, debris, and human bodies.5 February 15th marked British surrender of the island
a feat that took two weeks rather than the expected six months.6 It was also the first day of the 
Chinese New Year.  
 Six days later Operation Sook Ching began. 
INTRODUCTION 
Operation Sook Ching was a twelve-day long cleansing of ethnic Chinese Singaporeans during 
World War II. The Japanese forces occupying the island rounded up Chinese men and killed those 
they determined to be untrustworthy. Before it was called off, the Sook Ching left somewhere 
between 5,000 and 50,000 people dead, and it is remembered as the largest recent tragedy of the 
country.7 Despite the integral role race played in the crime, the Sook Ching has been memorialized 
as a massacre rather than a genocide. To gain a better understanding of the events that transpired, 
we must ask: what drove this decision, and what has the significance of the Sook Ching been in 
the years and decades after?  
I will begin with an overview of the invasion and Sook Ching itself, with a focus on the targeting 
of ethnic Chinese. The tragedy that occurred in Singapore was not isolated; it followed the Rape 
of Nanking and other war crimes committed against ethnic Chinese throughout east and southeast 
Asia. Viewing the Sook Ching as part of a lineage of racially driven crimes expands our 
understanding of it. The second section will overview of the history of genocide studies. This 
covers contemporary times, from World War II forward. Included are a variety of sources that 
provide a context of genocides and genocide studies that the Sook Ching fits into. I will then define 
genocide as it is used in this paper and lay out how I conceive the Sook Ching should fit in this 
framework. I use the United Nations Genocide Treaty as the basis for my argument by stating that 
the Sook Ching fits three out of their five determinants of genocide. This is followed by addressing 
potential reasons for why Singapore as a country does not view the crime as a genocide. Reasons 
i cl de ec ic ie   Ja a  a d he e h ic e i  ha  led  Si ga e  i de e de ce. Thi  
is followed by a series of counterpoints from both first- and second-hand sources arguing against 
a genocide classification. These arguments question the significance of the number of people 
killed, point out the gendered targeting of victims, and discuss the baselessness of the Japanese 
idea of Chinese guilt due to race. 
In section three, I also discuss the politics of memory and how it can help us better understand 
the legacy of the Sook Ching. I address both Singaporean and Japanese perceptions here. For 
Singaporeans, a series of impactful war shrines and monuments reflected changing perspectives. 
From demands for justice to cries for racial harmony, Si ga e  ela i hi   he S k Chi g 
has varied over the years. Japan has had an even more conflicted view of its wartime activities. 
Many people still visit the Yasukuni shrine each year, a site where several class A war criminals 
(those who committed crimes against peace) are interned.8 There has been a move towards 
acknowledgement of war crimes, but a sense of Japanese victimhood still often surrounds such 
discussions. This is caused in part by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, tragedies so 
enormous they may be seen to eclipse any suffering inflicted during the war. The differing 
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memories here are of particular importance because they give us insight into how war crimes and 
genocides can be understood and misunderstood with time. I will close with a comparison of the 
Sook Ching to the Cambodian Genocide, which had a more successful conviction of war criminals. 
This acts as a case study for future genocide prevention and war crime trials. I will also discuss 
what genocide prevention success storie  l k like a d h  he e  diffic l   ide if . 
Ultimately, I argue that the Sook Ching should be redefined from a massacre to a genocide because 
of its compliance with the United Nations Genocide Treaty standards for defining genocide.  
SECTION ONE: THE SOOK CHING 
Operation Sook Ching lasted from February 21 to March 4, 1942. It was a military operation 
carried out by the Japanese with the intent of executing anti-Japanese Chinese men between the 
ages of 18 and 50.9 The fact that the Sook Ching began only a week after Japan initially invaded 
Singapore means that it is likely they had plans for the cleansing beforehand.10 General Yamashita 
Tomoyuki was in charge of the occupation of Singapore. Although he clearly had a role in the Sook 
Ching, he arg ed ha  hi  e  e ceeded hi  e ec a i  i  e ec i g a e e e di al  f h ile 
Chinese, as he left his troops and marched on to Sumatra during the operation.11 He was 
eventually hanged in the Tokyo Trials after the war without ever being tried for his crimes in 
Malaya.12 
It is important to understand the demographics and layout of Singapore in order to understand 
the Sook Ching. In 1957, the date closest to the Sook Ching for which data is available, Singapore 
was 75.4% ethnic Chinese, 13.6% Malay, and 8.6% Indian.13 These percentages were likely similar 
to those during the Sook Ching. In addition, I have included below a map of killing and burial sites 
to help orient the reader (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Sites of killings and burials14 
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Ultimately, it is impossible to know exactly how many people were killed; the Japanese official 
figure is 5,000, while unofficial estimates reach as high as 50,000.15 Japanese Lieutenant Colonel 
Hishakari Takafumi, who was at that time a newspaper correspondent, stated that the troops had 
been instructed to kill 50,000 Chinese and had reached half that number by the time the operation 
was called off.16 One cause of uncertainty was the method used to dispose of bodies. They were 
typically taken to shorelines around the island and shot so that their bodies could be washed out 
to sea by the waves.17 Despite the inability to specify the number of deaths, the Sook Ching was 
certainly the largest single atrocity in the Southeast Asian portion of World War II, and served to 
strengthen, rather than weaken, the Chinese identity of Singapore.18 It serves as a good example 
of how national identities can be built around collective suffering, which I discuss in-depth in my 
la e  ec i  i led P li ic  f Me .  
During the Sook Ching, Chinese Singaporean men were called into screening centers, where 
the Kempeitai, the Japanese military police, determined whether they were anti-Japanese.19 Five 
groups were targeted in these procedures: 
(1) members of the volunteer force; 
(2) Communists; 
(3) looters; 
(4) those possessing arms; and 
(5) those whose names appeared in lists of anti-Japanese suspects maintained by Japanese 
intelligence.20 
There are several accounts, however, that state these qualifiers were not strictly upheld, and 
that the decision of whether someone was innocent or guilty was often arbitrary. For instance, all 
men who spoke the Hainanese dialect were targeted, as they were all considered communists.21 
At Jalan Besar, one of the screening centers, men who wore glasses were selected because they 
were assumed to be educated and therefore guilty, something with no ties to the five official 
categories.22 Once a man was determined to be guilty, he was loaded onto a lorry alongside other 
Singaporeans and transported to a remote portion of the island to be gunned to death.23 Known 
execution locations are Punggol, Changi, Katong, Tanah Merah and Blakang Mati, and several 
other sites are acknowledged by local people, although no concrete proof has been yet 
discovered.24 The operation was initially meant to last three days, but the Chinese population of 
Singapore was 600,000 in 1941, far too many to be processed in that time.25 For this reason the 
Sook Ching was extended.  
Surprisingly, the Japanese required little force to get these men to screening centers. In 
interviews sourced from the Singapore National Archives, Charlie Fook Ying Cheah, an eyewitness 
 he i a i , a ed, The e le e e e  cal . Y  ca  a  he  j  i l  k i  ligh l . 
Beca e he B i i h   he aga da: Oh, he e Ja a e e, he  g  he e a ch-box 
ae la e . The  ca  d  ch ha .  S  he e le e e, e  le , i e c fide . 26 
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Singaporeans, for the most part, believed that as bad as the invasion might seem, the British would 
come back and take care of things. This did not occur, and Japanese forces took Singapore and 
began to round up Chinese men. Cheah confirms that people were compliant with the summons: 
Of c e  k i g ha  [ he ] e e all ab , he e le a d elf e e i  fea  
that if the response was not there, they would use their soldiers to come out and physically check 
each individual flat. And that would make it worse for those of us caught remaining behind in the 
fla . S  he bl ff ked. 27 The fact that civilians voluntarily presented themselves to Japanese 
soldiers makes it clear that most were not expecting to be killed, making their unjust deaths all 
the more tragic.  
There is one notable case of Japanese resistance to the Sook Ching. Mamoru Shinozaki, a 
civilian administrator during Japanese occupation, actively helped to save tens of thousands of 
straits Chinese (the portion of the Chinese diaspora living in Singapore) and Eurasians during the 
proceedings.28  I  hi  d , he S k Chi g a  a c i e ha  llied he h  f he Ja a e e 
a . 29 There were many other Japanese that also helped the locals in a more limited fashion. 
One helped a man because he spoke some Shanghainese, a language the soldier spoke; another 
saved a family by telling them to stay inside during the summoning after seeing their mother 
praying to a Buddhist shrine for the Goddess of Mercy.30 It is thus clear that the Japanese forces 
were not a unified whole, but rather were a diverse ensemble of individuals capable of making 
their own choices. In this light, those who aided the Chinese are all the more heroic, and those 
who followed orders to kill much harder to defend.  
Chinese men were not the only victims of Japanese occupation. Although this thesis focuses on 
their suffering, it is important to note that many Singaporean women were victims of rape during 
Japanese occupation. Chinese women tended to be primary targets, as their ethnic group was 
already viewed with more disdain than their Malay peers.31 During the beginning of the Sook 
Ching, many families hid their female children in fear of a repeat of the Rape of Nanking, a crime 
f e h i  he egi  c llec i e e .32 It was also common for girls and women to darken their 
faces, leave their hair untended, and wear conservative clothing to make themselves less attractive 
to Japanese men.33 There are no concrete statistics on these rapes, and we are left with only sparse 
e e i e  acc . W e  e e i ea ed i  he  a  a  ell. I ll i cl de he e a b ief 
mention of the comfort women system; it was instituted by the Japanese military to decrease 
rapes, a goal that ultimately failed.34 Somewhere around 139,000 women were taken from 
Japanese occupied territories to serve the army full time, often getting shipped straight to battle 
f  de  he li i g f ili a  lie . 35 Acc di g  Lee, 80 e  ce  f he e e  
e e aged be ee  14 a d 18. 36 
Additionally, Singaporeans at the time were aware that the Japanese occupation was driven by 
race. In her seminal book The Syonan Years, Lee Geok Boi quotes Thambiraju Paramasivan, an 
I dia  a  h  li ed h gh he e i d: Se a g  R ad e ide  ld g   Race Course 
Road open field and put up Indian flag so that Japanese bombers would not drop their bombs 
he e. 37 She al  e  a E ea  h  fea ed f  hi  da gh e  afe : The e a  a e d f 
feeling also that [the Japanese] will not harm the Malay fa ilie . 38 C e a  e ide  
a a e e  f he S k Chi g  acial di e i  i  a e  e a i e a g e  f  he e e  
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revision from massacre to genocide. Had the killings been more indiscriminate, they could be 
viewed as part of a wartime massacre.  
The legacy of the Sook Ching took several forms. An important one to note is that of ethnic 
identities in Malaysia as a whole. Many influential British residents had hoped to form a 
multiracial identity in Malaysia, but the Sook Ching drove home the idea that racial splits within 
the country were still of great importance.39 Schools were formed in an attempt to unite the 
colony, but few Malays attended, and the Chinese majority was distrustful of the Western-
centered education they received.40 This distrust led to a widespread independence movement 
that ultimately failed due to a lack of Malay support, and independence only came once the nation 
formed coalitions of ethnically unified groups.41 This early emphasis on ethnic divides set a 
precede  f  Si ga e  e e al i de e de ce.  
SECTION TWO: A CASE FOR GENOCIDE 
This section contains an overview of the history of genocide studies, definitions of genocide, an 
explanation of the United Nations Genocide Treaty, an analysis of the Sook Ching through this 
lens, and counterpoints to my argument 
THE HISTORY OF GENOCIDE STUDIES 
Any discussion of genocide must begin with Raphael Lemkin. Lemkin was a Polish Jew famous 
for the coinage of the term genocide as well as for his subsequent study of the subject.42 His work 
began prior to World War II but did not become truly popular until after the war ended. His 
ultimate goal was to outlaw genocide not only as a war crime, but as a crime in and of itself.43 As 
he a e  i  hi  k i led Ge cide,  Genocide is not only a crime against the rules of war, but 
al  a c i e agai  h a i . 44 Lemkin recognized the importance of delegating the 
responsibility of trial to an international body to ensure true justice.45 Essentially, he set the 
standard for genocide die  i  f ll i g ea . Le ki  de i e f  i e a i al c  a  
fulfilled by the post-World War II trials, of which the Tokyo Trial is of greatest significance in 
relation to the Sook Ching. Unfortunately, perpetrators of the Sook Ching were not brought to 
justice at these trials, setting the stage for my research in modern times.  
Gregory Stanton published his Ten Stages of Genocide framework in 1986, helping to further 
refine the study of genocide. These stages are Classification, Symbolization, Discrimination, 
Dehumanization, Organization, Polarization, Preparation, Persecution, Extermination, and 
Denial.46 S a  gge ed e e i  e h d  f  each age a e ig ifica  i  he c e  f 
my argument, as they reflect events and processes that occurred during the Sook Ching. At the 
Classification stage, he recommends the building of institutions that transcend racial or ethnic 
boundaries to encourage cross cultural communication. At the Denial stage, he suggests that the 
perpetrators be tried by an international body to bring some semblance of justice for the victims.47 
These suggestions are fairly in line with the trajectories of genocides that have occurred before 
and after Stanton structured his framework, and portions of it can be effectively applied to the 
Sook Ching.  
Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal  Singsank 
 
Volume 17 Issue 1 Winter 2020             82 
 
Adopted in 1998, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court established the 
International Criminal Court and four main crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and the crime of aggression.48 This was a step in the right direction for genocide 
prevention, as it created a framework with which to prosecute these varieties of war crimes. Since 
this court is fairly new, we will have to wait and see what real effects it has in the long term. 
However, it does bode well for the future of genocide prevention. Although it was created long 
after the Sook Ching, I would argue that some acts committed in its duration would qualify as 
genocide under this statute. 
In 2002, Samantha Power published A Problem from Hell, a  a al i  f he U i ed S a e  
understanding of and responses to genocides around the world. It is a comprehensive book that 
covers the history of genocide beginning with the Armenian genocide in 1915 to present day issues. 
One important point Power makes is her suggested cause for increased US interest in anti-
ge cide la . She a ib e  hi   he e f d a a e e  ha  he U i ed S a e  ef al  
engage in discussions about anti-genocide law has damaged its international reputation.49 I point 
hi   a  a c e   Ja a  e e, hich ha  bee  a ide ead di i e e  i  i g 
anti-genocide legislation. I will expand upon their reasoning in my section addressing politics of 
memory, but I include this here as an introduction to the idea.  
In 2006, The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle was formally endorsed by the United 
Nations Security Council.50 Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon released a report titled Implementing 
the Responsibility to Protect that same year, which endorsed the R2P. Under R2P, individual 
governments agreed to do as much as possible to prevent mass atrocities from occurring. It is also 
stated that a UN mandate is required to give legitimacy to any movement to follow R2P, a 
safeguard against states using it to justify intervention into other countries.51 According to Ban 
Ki-Moon, cases of R2P being invoked without force outnumber those with force:  If  ac all  
l k a  he la  e e al ea , e e i ked he e ibili   ec , a  lea   he [UN] 
Secretariat side eight or nine times. Only in one of those cases, with Libya, was it tied to the use 
f a c i   ili a  f ce. 52 The Responsibility to Protect is a strong resource to help prevent 
and address war crimes. Although R2P has no impact on the Sook Ching, I include it here to 
suggest that any push towards preventing genocide should be examined critically from all angles. 
For this reason, I have been meticulous with my research and have run my ideas past multiple 
critics.  
In 2014, the United Nations published their Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes. This 
document provides guidelines for detecting early signs of an impending genocide, establishing 
risk factors and matching indicators.53 Genocide is one of the crimes targeted under this 
f a e k. The  a e, Ge cide, acc di g  i e a i al la , i  a c i e c i ed agai  
members of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Even though the victims of the crimes 
are individuals, they are targeted because of their membership, real or perceived, in one of these 
g . 54 This framework will hopefully be used with success to decrease genocides in future 
years.  
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I would like to note here that the sources I have addressed so far have a regional bias. We have 
just overviewed what genocide studies tend to look like in the West, as most efforts for defining it 
have taken place in that hemisphere; these studies are altered a bit in an Eastern Asian context. 
David Frank argues that international anti-genocide norms and their institutional incorporation 
have led to a quick decrease in genocide risks in East Asia.55 He points out that the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations have entered a relatively peaceful period, particularly 
when compared to just 50 years ago. The one clear exception is the current genocide of the 
Rohingya in Myanmar, in which a minority Muslim group is facing violent persecution by a 
Buddhist majority; this stands out even more starkly when compared to the relative peace of its 
surrounding countries.56 Frank also cites Alexander Bellamy, who lists four reasons that genocidal 
activities have slowed in Asia:  
The dramatic and sustained decline of genocide and mass atrocities in East Asia was not 
produced by any single factor, but by the combined effects of at least four important ones: a 
reduction in the deliberate targeting of civilians in war, growing incomes across the region, 
creeping democratization, and changing ideas about the nature of sovereignty and the 
responsibilities for protection.57 
All these points are important, but for my purposes I will refer to the fourth. Essentially, this 
i  de a e  ha   ca  a d d  cha ge. ASEAN  i c a i  f he R2P d c i e 
caused a shift in norms, leading to a decrease in genocidal action. These changes do not come 
about organically, but are rather pushed forwards by initiatives such as translated versions of the 
R2P and incorporation of the ideas into educational curriculums.58 I bring this article up to show 
how the study and prevention of genocide has formed in Asia, and what initiatives have succeeded 
in preventing further atrocities.  
ARGUMENT FOR SOOK CHING AS GENOCIDE  
There are many definitions of genocide, such as that by Mark Levene, a professor and author 
specializing in genocide. He i e , Ge cide cc  he  a a e, e cei i g he i eg i  f i  
agenda to be threatened by an aggregate population defined by the state in collective or 
communal terms seeks to remedy the situation by the systematic, en masse physical elimination 
of that aggregate, in toto,  il i  i   l ge  e cei ed  e e e  a h ea . 59 This definition 
makes the distinction that the event needs not have fully destroyed a population, but only needs 
to have decreased it to the point of no longer being perceived as a threat. This definition has the 
advantage of being concise and easy to read; however, for the purpose of my paper, I will use the 
U i ed Na i  defi i i  a d alifica i  f ge cide. I d    e e ha  I ili e he  
widely known and embraced delineation of the term, so that if one contests my points it results 
from faulty premises, rather than faulty definitions.  
The United Nations General Assembly adopted its genocide convention on December 9, 1948 
as a result of World War II atrocities.60 This treaty defines genocide as  
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... a  f he f ll i g ac  c i ed i h i e   de , in whole or in part, a national, 
ethical, racial or religious group, as such: 
 (a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
      group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated    
     to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the gr   a he  g . 61 
I claim that the Sook Ching qualifies as a genocide due to its fulfillment of three points on this 
list. Point A, killing members of the group, occurred when Japanese soldiers executed thousands 
of Chinese men en masse. Point B, causing serious bodily or mental harm, occurred in line with 
point A and also encompasses those citizens who faced attempted murder but survived (such as 
Cheng Kwong Yu, whose words will later be used as reference to prove the lack of distinction used 
when selecting victims). Point C is particularly important to my argument as it specifies that an 
ac  c i ed  de  a g  i  a  a  be de ig a ed a ge cide; i  i  clea  ha  he S k 
Ching was indeed intended to destroy a significant portion of the Singaporean Chinese 
population. As far as my research shows, no substantive evidence of points D or E exists in relation 
to the Sook Ching. However, as the Sook Ching fulfills three of the above criteria when only one is 
necessary to qualify an event as a genocide, I state that the Sook Ching should indeed be labeled 
as such.  
One important point in determining if the Sook Ching was a genocide is that Japanese forces 
had a premeditated number of killings they were to commit, at least according to Lieutenant 
Colonel Hishakari Takafumi.62 The government had established plans for the Sook Ching in their 
"I le e a i  G ideli e f  Ma i la i g O e ea  Chi e e,  d a   i  la e Dece be  
1941.63 As a reminder, the operation had five categories of targeted Chinese: members of the 
volunteer force, Communists, looters, those possessing arms, and those whose names appeared 
in lists of anti-Japanese suspects maintained by Japanese intelligence.64 There are several 
accounts, however, that state these were not strictly upheld, and the decision of whether someone 
was innocent or guilty was often arbitrary. In a Straits Times interview, Cheng Kwong Yu, a 
i  f he a ac e, de c ibed he elec i  ce : The e a  a c d ha  ca e a d 
picked us out. They had a liki g f  h e h  e e big. 65 He also stated that there were neither 
trials nor additional questions asked. All of the people around him were Chinese.66 These accounts 
demonstrate that there were ulterior motives beyond simply weeding out opposition. In postwar 
trials, Hishakari also stated that he had been instructed to kill 50,000 Chinese in Singapore; he 
was later told it was impossible to kill this number, and the massacre was called off.67 This is a 
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condemning statement: if the killings were executed not to target threats to the state, but rather 
to fill a quota, it negates any claim of justified killing.   
Of additional importance is the question of genocide versus politicide and democide. Rudolph 
Rummel, a professor at the University of Hawaii, differentiates genocide from other forms of state 
violence.68 He believes that genocide is a killing of people due to group memberships such as 
religion and race, while politicide is a killing due to political ideology or for political purposes.69 
Democide encompasses these two, along with mass murders, as long as they are committed by a 
government. The Sook Ching would fall somewhere between genocide and politicide on this scale, 
depending on how significant one believes race to have been in the proceedings. Although the 
United Nations genocide qualifications is the main framework used in this paper, definitions such 
a  R el  e e  c le e  i .  
G eg  S a  Te  S age  f Ge cide  i  a he  ef l l  e al g ide he UN  
Genocide Convention. The seventh stage, Preparation, rings particularly true. As Stanton states, 
Leade  f e  clai  ha  if e d  kill he , he  ill kill , di g i i g ge cide a  elf-
defense. Acts of genocide are disguised as counter-insurgency if there is an ongoing armed conflict 
 ci il a . 70 Thi  i  eflec ed i  he Ke ei ai  a ge i g f Si ga ea  Chi e e, a ic la l  
i h hei  a al f he e  a  a h ea   Ja a e e cc a i  d e  hei  ace. S a  
system proves useful for identifying the stages of genocides and can potentially help us to prevent 
further crimes.  
REASONS FOR SINGAPORE’S ACCEPTANCE OF MASSACRE DESIGNATION 
Si ga e  hi  i  i a   c ide  he  a al i g ea  f  he S k Chi g  
being labeled a genocide. After the Japanese occupation period, the British took back Singapore 
in 1945; it remained under British control until September 16, 1963, when it merged with 
Malaysia.71 Singapore remained part of Malaysia until August 9, 1965, when it became 
independent.72 This independence came about as a result of clashes between the majority ethnic 
Chinese population in Singapore and the Malay population in Malaya and in Sabah and Sarawak 
states in Borneo.73 This will be discussed in more depth in the section i led Si ga e  
Me .  Si ga e  ajec  f a i -building subsequently broke off from the route taken 
by most other Southeast Asian countries. Their emphasis was not on creating a mythological 
history for themselves or shunning foreigners but rather on modernizing as quickly as possible 
and making themselves an indispensable part of the region.74 This, when compared to the 
trajectories of neighboring countries such as Cambodia and Thailand, differentiated Singapore 
and helps to explain the imp a ce f a c he i e Si ga ea  ide i . Si ga e  all i e 
also became a blessing; infrastructure overhauls for the entire country were possible, and 
centering itself as a commercial center was feasible.75 Ultimately, it is likely that an initial lack of 
independence and subsequent turmoil made it hard for Singapore, either as a colony or young 
nation, to focus its energy on re-qualifying the Japanese war crimes.  
Si ga e  eca i  ge li ical a di g al  c ib ed  f a d-looking policie . I e 
already discussed some issues stemming from clashes with Malaysia, but Singapore had another 
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neighbor who began making bold international moves in the 1960s. Indonesia announced their 
Konfrontasi, or Confrontation, on January 20th, 1963.76 It lasted from 1963 to 1966 and was a 
e e  he e cei ed e -c l iali  jec  f c ea i g he Fede a i  f Mala ia.77 The 
Konfrontasi included bombings, armed incursions, and propaganda in conflicted regions such as 
Singapore.78 I d e ia  g e e  had  i i ial i e  i h he Mala ia  g e e  la , 
but the Brunei Revolt of December 1962 changed its position. The revolt was instigated by 
insurgents who did not want Brunei to join Malaysia and was quickly silenced by British forces.79 
This signaled to Indonesia that the Malaysian government was still a pawn of the British, and an 
armed insurgency was superior to a diplomatic solution. Singapore was one of several targeted 
areas, with the first bomb attack occurring eight days after it joined Malaysia.80 International 
h ea   Si ga e  ec i  likel  di aded he g e e  f  hi g f  e ib i  
against Japan, one of its few allies (as I will discuss momentarily).  
A lack of international pressure may have also played a role in Si ga e  el c a ce  h 
for more comprehensive recognition of the Sook Ching. The International Military Tribunal was 
active during the late 1940s, and tried war crimes.81 Since Singapore was not independent until 
the 1960s, the majority of public awareness of the crimes had vanished. It is also likely that 
Singapore as a young nation had little interest in further destabilizing its relationship with other 
countries. It had broken with Malaysia and desperately needed allies; Japan became one of its 
very first.  
Japan also has a history of crimes against the Chinese, setting a precedent for the Sook Ching 
Massacre. This may also contribute to why it has not drawn international attention; the crimes in 
mainland China were so violent and numerous that they may dwarf it in comparison. The 1937 
Ra e f Na ki g  ick  i  c llec i e e  a  e f he g ea e  c i e  f he Sec d W ld 
War, in which Japanese soldiers massacred hundreds of thousands of Chinese and raped 300,000 
in three months.82 The fact that Nanking was the capital of China when it was sacked makes the 
tragedy all the more poignant. Events in mainland China such as the Nanking Massacre typically 
outweigh the comparatively smaller atrocities enacted in Southeast Asia, both in the criminal 
courts and in collective history. This makes it harder for countries such as Singapore to push for 
recognition of Japanese war crimes. 
Another reason that Singapore has not pursued charges against Japan may be the economic 
relationship between the two countries. Because Singapore was not independent until 1965, it 
could not establish an individual relationship prior to that point. It is also important to note that 
soon after independence, Singapore and Japan agreed on a reparations payment of $50 million 
Singapore dollars.83 This 1967 agreement set a strong precedent for diplomatic relations between 
both parties. In the same year, the Civilian War Memorial, the primary location for remembrance 
of the Sook Ching, was unveiled. At its unveiling, Lee Kuan Yew, the first prime minister of an 
independent Singapore, stated: "We meet not to rekindle old fires of hatred nor to seek 
settlements for blood debts. We meet to remember the men and women who are the hapless 
victims of one of the fires of history. We suffered together. It told us that we shared one destiny."84 
Clearly, there had been a move towards forgiving the crimes of history.  
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The choice to establish diplomatic relations with Japan aided Singapore greatly in the decades 
ha  f ll ed. I  he 1970 , Ja a  beca e Si ga e  la ge  adi g a e  a d f eig  
investor.85 Singapore also began to incorporate many aspects of Japanese society and culture, 
such as neighborhood police posts and Japanese food.86 These ties made it both impractical and 
de i able  f c   he c  i le  a . Thi  i  ill e i  he de  da ; c e l , 
Ja a  i  Si ga e  fif h la ge  f eig  i vestor (making up 6.9% of investment), and Singapore 
i  Ja a  f h la ge  (13.2%).87 The two countries have also engaged in multiple trade 
agreements. By increasing economic involvement, Singapore is increasingly unlikely to push for 
a revitalization of post-World War II anger. As two regional superpowers, Japan and Singapore 
have a responsibility to maintain diplomatic relations, something that could become destabilized 
if Singapore publicly called for a revision of the Sook Ching Massacre.  
It is very difficult to categorize and prosecute genocide. This is particularly true when 
e a i i g a egi e like ha  f a i e Ja a , i  hich a e dic   Hi hi  g il  i  i elf 
difficult to reach. He was never tried for his involvement in World War II.88 In an environment as 
contentious as this, it becomes all the more difficult to address the question of genocide guilt. Who 
would be held accountable? Perhaps the leaders of the Kenpeitai, or military police, in Singapore; 
however, these were simply the people acting out orders given by their superiors. The people 
issuing the orders would likely be next in line. These would be either Chief of Planning and 
Operations Tsuji Masanobu, or Chief of Staff Hayashi Tadahiko.89 However, what about Hideki 
Tojo, the prime minister during the Sook Ching Massacre? He was found guilty of waging war 
illegally and violating international law, as well as inhumane treatment of prisoners.90 Perhaps he 
would be the best choice, as he has already been found guilty of comparable crimes. This 
discussion highlights the difficulty of genocide trials, in that the appropriate object of trial is often 
not a single entity but the entire system. This is complicated further when the perpetrating system 
has dissolved, as the Japanese military government guilty for the Sook Ching Massacre has. 
Addressing these difficulties is a long and arduous task that garners little international attention. 
Although not impossible, the idea of reviving a crime as old as the Sook Ching seems unrealistic. 
The Cambodian Genocide is still being legally hashed out over 40 years after it began; how can we 
expect this same diligence for a 77-year-old crime of a comparatively tiny scale?  
COUNTERPOINTS 
One argument against the qualification of the Sook Ching as a genocide was its focus on 
quantifying the people killed. Because the death count, which ranges from 5,000 to 50,000, pales 
in comparison to events such as the Holocaust and the Khmer Rouge Genocide, some argue that 
the Sook Ching does not fit the definition. However, the UN genocide convention does not 
mention any number of deaths needed to qualify an event as a genocide. Indeed, some qualifiers 
do not even require deaths to occur. For this reason, I argue that the number of deaths does not 
disqualify the Sook Ching from being defined as a genocide.  
Another possible point of contention is the fact that the Sook Ching Massacre did not focus on 
killing all Chinese Singaporeans, but targeted only men aged 18-50. This, however, does not 
disqualify it, as there is a precedent set by the Srebrenica Genocide of 1995. In this small Bosnian 
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town, 8,372 Muslim males were massacred by the Serbian military government.91 Although this 
tragedy was limited to men, and thus was clearly not meant to destroy Muslim Serbs in their 
entirety, the act was ruled a genocide in the 2007 International Criminal Tribunal.92 After all, the 
U i ed Na i  e  he la g age i  h le  i  a ,  a d e  a e ce ai l  a a  f he 
population. Because of the ruling on the Srebrenica Genocide, I argue that the Sook Ching should 
qualify as a genocide as well.  
I will also mention here a more fundamental criticism of my argument. Robert Cribb, Professor 
of Asian History at the Australian National University, pointed out potential issues with this 
he i  age f he a e e  i  h le  i  a  lled f  he UN ea . He i e : 
The specification 'in whole or in part' in the Genocide Convention is problematic. 
Clearly it can't be just 'in whole' or genocidaires would escape by sparing (or not reaching) 
a single potential victim. On the other hand, it feels to me that it seriously stretches the 
definition if any killing of some members of another ethnic group is identified as genocide. 
The extended definition would make it difficult to exclude the killing of enemy soldiers in 
battle from being regarded as genocide. In choosing a definition of genocide, I think it's 
important to consider what other cases would become genocide and whether the overall 
effect is morally or analytically acceptable. 
It feels to me that genocide should refer to an attempt to destroy a community, even if 
that community is only part of its overall ethnic/religious/national group. Thus, the 
murder of all the members of an ethnic community in a town, district or province could be 
considered genocidal, as in Bosnia, whereas the assassination of political leaders of that 
community or the execution of militia members would not. 
In the case of Sook Ching, it seems to me that although the victims were all Chinese, 
they were not targeted because of their ethnicity but because they were identified (by a 
flawed and ramshackle method) as individuals likely to resist Japanese rule. Many Chinese 
were 'screened' and released because they were judged to be harmless. Release in that way 
is not usually a characteristic of genocide.93 
C ibb  d  all    ha e a h gh f l di c i , a d he ai e  a  alid i , hich 
I will take a moment to counter here. Firstly, I argue that the very fact that Chinese men were 
targeted specifically is due to their race. It is true that there was significant Chinese resistance to 
Japanese rule; however, this is because there was a significant Japanese presence in China. 
Chinese people were not inherently more prone to dissent. The fact that Japan was occupying 
areas with large Chinese populations simply made it more likely that those pushing back against 
it would be Chinese. General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the man in charge of the Singaporean 
occupation, believed that Singaporean Chinese were more c ba a  d e  a all g  
strong resistance to Japanese occupation of the island.94 I argue that this misrepresents the 
population, as due to a demographic majority of Chinese in Singapore, it is most likely that any 
resistance group there would be primarily ethnic Chinese.  
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Despite this, one could say that Japanese forces had an inclination that ethnic Chinese abroad 
might side with their countrymen and cause disruptions. This was, according to Cribb, mostly due 
to their significant population in Singapore and a history of involvement in mainland Chinese 
politics.95 However, there was no direct evidence of potential insurgency, as Japanese forces had 
not previously occupied Singapore. The idea that racial ties might cause problems is one that may 
at first seem compelling but upon further examination becomes more problematic. Indeed, this 
approach appears to me to be similar to that used in Japanese American internment, where ethnic 
ties were seen as an inherent sign of guilt.  
As for the fact that these Chinese Singaporeans were killed for political reasons, I will again 
efe e ce  i  ab  he b c i  f li icide i   Defi i i  f Ge cide  ec i . 
Although I do agree that there are many elements of the Sook Ching that tie in with political 
violence, and that ideally it would fall somewhere on the scale between politicide and genocide, 
this differentiation strikes me as divisive. When race plays as strong of a role as it did in the Sook 
Ching killings, I believe it irresponsible to dismiss its importance under the aegis of political 
killings. This detracts from the fact that these men would simply not have died had they been a 
race other than Chinese. By saying that they died for political reasons, one implies that it was 
acceptable that Japanese forces determined political leanings by ethnic ties. If this mentality is 
accepted for the Sook Ching, how is it different from saying that Japanese American internment 
was in fact a legitimate, non-racist decision on the part of the U i ed S a e  g e e ?  
SECTION THREE: POLITICS OF MEMORY 
In this section I will lay out the Singaporean and Japanese politics of memory relating to the 
Sook Ching, focusing on their significance as represented by physical monuments as well as 
presenting possible reasons for the differences we see.  
SINGAPORE’S MEMORY 
In modern day, each February 15 is a day of remembrance during which Singaporean school 
children are instructed to think about the suffering that their people underwent during the period 
of Japanese occupation. This remembrance is not limited to those of Chinese ancestry and instead 
is meant as an experience of collective suffering amongst all ethnicities.96 This was an intentional 
a eg  ha  P i e Mi i e  Lee K a  Ye  e ac ed i   Si ga e  e l i  f  Mala ia. 
This unification around a tragic event serves to create a sense of national identity, regardless of 
accuracy. After all, it was primarily Chinese Singaporeans who suffered, but the focus on collective 
suffering serves to soothe these racial divisions. 
War memorials were important f  b h Si ga e a d Ja a . O  Si ga e  ide, he 
Civilian War Memorial, the centralized post for remembrance of the Sook Ching, is particularly 
notable. As seen in Figure 2, i  i  c ed f f  illa  k  a  The Ch ick ,  each ea  
to represent an ethnic group of Singapore that suffered under Japanese rule: Chinese, Malay, 
Indian, and Eurasian.97 They represent racial unity by merging at their bases. Racial unity, 
however, was not the initial goal of the monument. It was constructed in response to widespread 
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demand by the Chinese Singaporean community as an acknowledgement of their suffering in 
particular.98  
 
Figure 2: The Civilian War Memorial99 
What explains this shift in commemoration? Ke i  Blackb  a icle The C llec i e Memory 
f he S k Chi g Ma ac e a d he C ea i  f he Ci ilia  Wa  Me ial f Si ga e  gi e  a 
possible answer. An essential argument Blackburn makes is that the Sook Ching was harnessed 
by leaders of the young nation after its independence as a method of creating a national identity.100 
Si ga e  i de e de ce a   l a . I  had bec e a a  f Mala ia i  1963, b  i hi  
two years, racial and political tensions came to the forefront of politics. Chinese Singaporeans felt 
discriminated against due to affirmative action policies put in place to benefit Malaysians, and 
racial tensions reached a peak during the July 21st, 1964 riots between Malay and Chinese youths 
in Singapore.101A  he a e i e, Si ga e  g ec  a  a e cei ed h eat to the central 
power of Kuala Lumpur. In conflict with past agreements, Singapore continued to face internal 
trading restrictions.102 For these reasons, on August 9th, 1965, Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman expelled Singapore from the nation with a vote of 126-0, leaving Lee Kuan Yew, 
e i l  he leade  f he Pe le  Ac i  Pa --the primary party of Singapore--the 
unexpected head of a nation.103 He had only been warned of the impending separation three days 
before and was unable to mend the rift despite his best efforts. A tearful quote from the press 
conference reads "For me, it is a moment of anguish. All my life, my whole adult life, I have 
believed in merger and unity of the two territories."104 Lee Kuan Yew voiced the opinion of many 
Singaporeans in this quote, and the new country was left to create a sense of self.  
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The nature of this separation is significant because it drives home the importance of creating 
a national identity for the new leaders of Singapore. Typically, nations have a sense of national 
identity prior to being formed. Whether it be ethnic, political, or simply strong geographical ties, 
it is atypical to encounter a nation such as Singapore in which its very existence was, to some 
degree, nonconsensual. For this reason, leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew used the tragedy of the 
Sook Ching to foster a sense of national cohesion. His sponsorship of the Civilian War Memorial 
represented this goal of racial unity. Although it, to some degree, diluted the suffering of Chinese 
Singaporeans by claiming that all citizens suffered equally, it did present a more unifying message. 
Lee Kuan Yew was not necessarily acting selfishly. It may seem to our eyes that he determined the 
Sook Ching an insignificant enough crime that one could reinterpret it without much 
consequence; however, he was himself a survivor of the genocide. Lee had escaped off one of the 
lorries transporting men to be killed, barely escaping death.105 Clearly, he was acting not from self-
interest but from what he believed would be best for the nation.  
There was one subversive addition that commemorated Chinese losses. 600 funeral urns were 
interred below the monument, signifying the ashes of Chinese victims quietly settling into their 
final resting place.106 The bodies of those murdered in the Sook Ching form the foundation for the 
memorial we see today. When I visited the memorial in 2018, I was unable to find any English 
e f he  e e ce. Al h gh I d   k  if he  e e e i ed i  a  he  la g age , 
this silent acknowledgement of Chinese suffering fills a gap left by the race-blind 
acknowledgements of the memorial itself. The complex history of the Civilian War Memorial 
demonstrates how collective memory can both be used and subverted for national interests.  
The e i  al  a  a g e   be ade ha  he Ja a e e cc a i  i fl e ced Si ga e  
eventual independence. Under Japanese rule, residents of Singapore were forced to contemplate 
their own racial and political identities. During the occupation, Malays were typically treated well, 
and often became pro-Japanese.107 Straits Chinese typically held opposing views because they 
were treated poorly. After Japanese forces were driven out, the divides within communities often 
became contentious. Ahmad Khan, a Singaporean who investigated wartime collaborators, stated, 
If he Ja a e e Occ a i  a   ha e achie ed a hing else...it did create...political 
a ake i g. 108 It is quite possible that the racial rifts which formed during occupation played a 
le i  Si ga e  e e al e l i  f  Mala ia.  
Once Singapore was independent, it had to create its own identity. As I mentioned before, Lee 
Kuan Yew wanted to avoid a racial split for this determination, so he decided to emphasize 
collective suffering to unify the country. Wang Gungwu, a Singaporean scholar of China and the 
Chinese Diaspora, discusses another route and reason for creating a collective Singaporean 
ide i . He efe e ce  Si ga e  a i al he i age a d a i -building. Singaporean leaders 
made a conscious decision to de-emphasize any sense of history in their early years.109 According 
to Minister S. Dha abala , hi  a  beca e e e e all  e cc ied i h i i g he 
e e    ab  ec di g i  f  he f e. 110 This sentiment was pushed even further by 
a fear that hunting for history would divide the nation. As a multiethnic country born of a colony, 
ie  e e ha  ea chi g f  hi  ld ei he  lead back  E e   each e h ici  
home country.111 These concerns ran so deeply that history as a subject was dropped from primary 
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school curriculums in 1972.112 All of this is to say that for a period, Singapore had little, if any, 
cohesive sense of history or identity. 
 It was only in the 1980s that people began to speak seriously about the detriments of lacking 
a national history. Essentially, people worried that without any binding history, Singapore would 
risk dissolution if ever threatened by a conquering force.113 In other words, if their economic power 
and physical location were shaken, what cultural ties would remain? For this reason, the 1990s 
saw the beginning of a nation building initiative. This led to a standardized National Education in 
1997, hich al  e ed f  he fac  ha  i  a  f d ha  a  Si ga ea ...did  k  
h  Si ga e beca e a  i de e de  a i [,] he  Si ga e gai ed i de e de ce, a d 
tha  Si ga e a  ce a  f Mala ia. 114 At the same time, the memoir of Senior Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew--who had retired from his post as Prime Minister-- was published, driving home the 
point that history was now of value.115 The 1964 and 1969 race riots were referenced in this memoir 
as an example of what can happen if a nation does not address its racial tensions and create a 
sense of shared history.116 Lee K a  Ye  e i  beca e he defi i i e elli g f Si ga ea  
history. The problem with this was that it made this history distinctly political. Lee Kuan Yew was 
he leade  f he Pe le  Ac i  Pa  (PAP), he single party that has run the country since its 
inception.117 U i g hi  e i  ade Si ga e  hi  a a i a  ale, a d i deed ade i  e 
vulnerable to criticism.  
The Sook Ching did not play a large role in this nation-building, because it was primarily one 
ethnic group that suffered during it. It would have weakened the national identity to focus too 
ch  he ffe i g f l  Chi e e Si ga ea . I  ld al  ha e ha ed Si ga e  i age 
after its breakup with Malaysia, as it fought hard to portray itself as multicultural rather than as 
only Chinese. It was easier to focus on events that preceded and followed the break than World 
War II era events, which would have less widespread sympathy with a 1990s population. This 
concern over racial tensions helps to explain why the Sook Ching was not redefined as a genocide. 
The attention that would have ben paid to a mostly Chinese-based war crime would have re-
emphasized racial divisions in Singaporean society. 
It is also important to note that the Sook Ching was not an isolated incident. It was part of the 
larger occupation of Singapore by Japan, which had wider cultural impacts. One example is the 
education system set in place during Syonan-to, or occupation, which lasted from 1942 to 1945. 
After a one-month closure for reorganization, Japan reopened schools in April of 1942, just over 
a month after the Sook Ching.118 Primary schools began mandatory Japanese classes in July, with 
students learning the Japanese anthem and celebrating Japanese festivals.119 School attendance 
declined during the Japanese occupation. Families who could homeschooled their children, a 
custom enhanced by the fact that no secondary schools were open during Syonan-to.120 This was 
likely due to the lowered quality in education, as much attention was paid to assimilation into 
Japanese culture and little to academic success. These same traits were found in the few 
universities left open, where many students likewise ceased attendance. It is likely that this 
shortage of good education played into postwar resentment of the Japanese, enhanced by the fact 
that education under the occupation focused on immersing students in the culture of the 
conquerors.  
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The war crime trials in Singapore are also important for our understanding of memory and 
retribution. Tsuji Masanobu, the primary architect of the Sook Ching, was never convicted for 
crimes relating to the genocide; it is likely the Kuomintang, the governing party in China, were 
sheltering him back in mainland China during the trials.121 The war crime trials lasted from 1946 
to 1948, and tried 1,101 men.122 One thing that prevented the Sook Ching from receiving adequate 
attention in these trials was its timing. These trials addressed crimes from many parts of Asia and 
Oceania, not just those that occurred in Singapore. The Sook Ching was addressed last in the 
trials, which meant that many of the prosecutors and witnesses were tired and ready for the 
process to end.123 Only seven men were tried. Two of these, Kawamura Saburo and Oishi 
Masayuki, received the death sentence, and the other five received life sentences that ended after 
five years when Japan regained its sovereignty.124 There were 133 recipients of the death penalty 
from other crimes addressed in the Singapore trials. Compared to these, those responsible for the 
Sook Ching seemed lightly punished.125  
It is likely that this comparatively light sentencing prevented victims from feeling free of their 
wartime experiences. This is echoed in the memories of some survivors. The Overseas Chinese 
Appeal Committee was formed during these trials with the singular goal of securing a death 
sentence for all convicted Japanese. The committee, along with two war widows, were permitted 
to watch the two hangings that did occur.126 They wanted to watch these hangings so that they 
could feel some sort of justice for the crimes committed against them. Indeed, after the hangings 
e f he id  i  ed  ha e aid, I   a i fied. I a   ee hei  face   ake e 
he  a e dead. 127 Even seeing two men put to death for their crimes did not satiate a need for 
justice. I believe that this lack of any collective sense of justice among Chinese Singaporeans is 
e f he ai  ea  he S k Chi g  c llec i e e  i   c le , a  a  belie e h e 
who perpetrated the crime were not held accountable.  
In the decade following World War II, Singapore struggled to figure out how to deal with the 
Japanese who remained on the island. Organizations such as the Singapore Japanese Association 
reopened, and man  e be  f he Ja a e e c i  e ed  he i la d a  ad i e  
who succeeded in reviving themselves socially and economically with the use of wartime 
connections.128 Local Japanese were thus able to regain their stature in Singaporean society, 
something that would likewise happen for non-Singaporean Japanese a couple decades later. In 
this case, stature is regained through economic, not social, means. As Bayly and Harper remind 
us, 
By 1972 Southeast Asian countries purchased nearly 12 per cent of total Japanese exports and 
lied 16 e  ce  f al i . B  1979, 35.4 e  ce  f Ja a  al a fac i g 
i e e ...a d 43 e  ce  f i e e  i  i i g a  i  S hea  A ia E e  af e  he a ,  
e Ja a e e hi ia  ha  b e ed, any Japanese businessmen and entrepreneurs still 
h gh  f I d e ia a  a  f ec d Ma ch ia. 129 
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Ja a  ec ic e i i  e  e l  i de e de  Si ga e ade he  a g all . Thi  
ties back into my earlier section discussing potential reasons for the Sook Ching not being 
acknowledged as a genocide. Economic ties can erase many historical injustices, and Singapore 
struggled with this dilemma after the war.   
In the 1990s, Japan began to spread its influence socially, politically, and economically into 
the Southeast Asian region once again. This came as a result of their attempts to work as 
peacekeepers during the Gulf War.130 Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki visited member 
states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from April to May of 1991 in an 
a e   e g he  ela i  i h he egi , a d i  Si ga e i ed a  a l g  f  Ja a  
ac i  d i g he S k Chi g. He a ed hi  g feeli g f e e f   c  ac  ha  
caused unbearable suffering and grief among many people in the Asia-Pacific egi ,  a  a l g  
that was not fully accepted by Singaporeans.131 Former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
a ed ha  Ja a e e eacekee i g f ce  e e la  beca e i  a  like gi i g ch c la e 
filled i h hi k   a  alc h lic. 132 Japan had not properly apologized for their actions during 
World War II, so why should they be trusted to once again arm themselves and interfere with 
i e a i al c flic ? Si ga e  di a i fac i  i h Ja a e e i e e i  50 ea  af e  he 
Sook Ching demonstrates that the wrongs committed by their army had not been properly 
apologized for.  
I ill al  i cl de efe e ce  Pa l Sl ic  d   chic bi g he e i  de   f he  
explain how genocide is viewed on a global scale. He proposes that a psychophysical function, the 
c ec i  be ee  he h ical ld a d e  eac i   i , a  e lai  h  e le ha e a 
difficult job registering the magnitude of mass killings. This model suggests that psychophysical 
numbing may result from being exposed to numbers too large to easily conceptualize.133 However, 
this model suggests that empathy caps out at a certain point, but is maintained at that level of 
magnitude. Slovic, therefore, proposes another idea for why genocides may be received with little 
to no empathy. An earlier study that Slovic helped facilitate found that people were twice as likely 
to donate winnings to an identified child in need than to a general cause.134 Shockingly, however, 
when another group was exposed both to the child in need and the statistics about a larger issue, 
their contributions to the child declined. Additionally, a follow-up study showed that when 
participants were primed with calculative th gh , i le a i h e ic calc la i ,  a he  ha  
emotive ones, they donated less.135 Even more concerning is the fact that when Slovic and others 
ran an experiment to see how large a group must be to demonstrate a decrease in empathy, they 
found that a group as small as two may determine a significant drop in empathy.136 It is likely that 
he S k Chi g  ea e  a  i fl e ced b  chic bi g. The hee  be  f e le killed 
i  e gh  e hel  he b ai  ca aci  f  e a h , e hi g  helped by the fact that 
we typically discuss the genocide in terms of numbers, rather than personal stories or specific 
people.  
Ultimately, Slovic determines that an important move to increase genocide prevention is an 
emphasis on rational thought. He refe e ce  he cce f l a ifica i  f he U i ed Na i  
Genocide Treaty, a rational choice made in 1948 to draw up a document with which genocide 
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might be prevented and punished.137 I agree with his approach, and hope to contribute to this 
rational field of thought by constructing this thesis in a logical, straightforward manner.  
JAPAN’S MEMORY 
I ill i cl de he e a h  di c i  f Ja a  e  f W ld Wa  II, a  I belie e i  i  
i a   e a i e b h ide  e ie  f he S k Chi g i  de  o better understand the 
crime. Comparisons between Germany and Japan are popular in the postwar period, and it is of 
e ha  Ja a  i  icall  c ide ed  ha e he be e  a  e i d, de i e Ge a  
arguably fighting a better strategic war overall.138 This was largely due to the lack of 
acknowledgement of war crimes on the Japanese side, paired with a lack of public awareness after 
the war. Japan was allowed to move forward from their war legacy without the same punishment 
that Germany faced. The Ya k i Sh i e i  a g d e a le f ble  i h Ja a  a  
memory. As seen in Figure 3, it is a shrine to those killed during war in Japan with a contentious 
history; several Class A war criminals, those who committed crimes against peace, were secretly 
interned there in 1978.139 Public officials also made several visits to the shrine in the far right 
period of the 1980s, when many Japanese became more nationalist.140 Among them was Prime 
Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro in 1985, whose visit sparked widespread controversy due to the 
perceived tacit approval of those war criminals interned at the shrine.141 This created tensions 
between those who had lost people close to them in wars, and those who treated the shrine as a 
physical embodiment of Japanese nationalism.  
 
Figure 3: Yasukuni Shrine142 
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A e ica  Ge e al D gla  MacA h  e abli hed he T k  T ial , Ja a  a  ial , 
hich la ed a g ea  le i  he de e i a i  ab  Ja a  f e. The ai  i e a  ha  
Allied Powers had significant issues among themselves. The late 1940s brought about the 
escalation of the Cold War, and MacArthur decided that democratization and demilitarization 
were less important for Japan than reconstructing and rearming.143 This allowed the allies to use 
the country as a supporter, but this came with many consequences. Nineteen Class A war criminal 
suspects were released, and only microfilms of the trial records were made available in select 
places.144 This meant that there was an immense decrease in external pressure to fix war legacies 
in Japan. Because of this, it was not until the 1990s that Japan began to investigate its World War 
II era war crimes in greater detail. According to historian Sheila Miyoshi Jager, this was because 
he e l  c e  c ce  f e  ided a b ad blic i h a le  h gh hich  
reexamine the entire postwar order and discover missed chances or unresolved issues that might 
e  lai  he c e  cial a d li ical i abili . 145 It was also hastened by the fact that most 
eyewitnesses and victims were aging or dying. This revival in interest about World War II crimes 
contrasted with previous periods when Japan was notorious for ignoring wrongs committed in 
the eastern hemisphere during the war.  
A he  e la a i  f Ja a  el c a ce  c f  hei  c i e  ela e   he T k  T ial . 
After the war concluded, victorious countries ran these trials to hold Japanese forces accountable 
for both starting the Pacific theater of the war and for their various war crimes.146 The idea f a  
e ibili  he e alie a ed a  Ja a e e ci i e . E e iall , Ja a  a  held e i el  
responsible for the wars with Allied powers and China during 1931 to 1945.147 Many contemporary 
Japanese citizens, as well as later historians, disagree with this verdict. The fact that victor 
countries prosecuted Japan made it all but impossible for them to take any form of responsibility 
for beginning the war, both out of fear that Japan would thus avoid responsibility and because it 
ld de i e hei  e e a i  f a g d a  ha  i dica ed hei  ac i .148 Anger over 
hi  e cei ed h c i  ade a  i  Ja a  le  eg e f l f hei  c  a  c i e . I  i  
understandable that they felt this way; when the country prosecuting your war trials bombed 
civilians with nuclear weapons not once, but twice, it would likely be difficult to be as 
compassionate as during an impersonal trial. This demonstrates the importance of assigning 
responsibility on all sides, whether or not one force is considered the victor. Perhaps if other 
countries such as the United States had taken more responsibility for their wartime crimes, Japan 
might have had less reluctance to face their own.  
An important note for why Japan may have been reluctant to acknowledge many crimes was 
because of the way their veterans were treated in the postwar period. The military bore the brunt 
of the blame for postwar destitution, and most discharged veterans had difficulty reestablishing 
themselves in the civilian world.149 Because they were so disdained, many veterans were reluctant 
to speak out about their experiences in the war, and 48.3 percent of veterans wanted to speak but 
f d i  e ha  i ible  be de d. 150 An additional problem was that of the people 
who did choose to share their experiences in immediate postwar times, as many bragged 
shamelessly about their victories and crimes without guilt.151 It was not until the 1970s that many 
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veterans who felt shame spoke out, and by that time, a precedent of bravery and victory had 
already been set.  
This all shows that Japanese memory and approach to war reconciliation was complex. Their 
desire to forget war crimes in the immediate postwar period did not stem from a collective evil or 
a diminution of the value of human life, but rather came in large part from civilian horror and 
misplaced blame. Many Japanese citizens who did not fight abroad did not know the extent of 
hei  a  c i e , a d h e h  did f e  fel   ciall  h eatened to speak out. Being aware 
of these reasons helps explain why memories of the Sook Ching have not been fully explored in 
Japan and may give us a leg up in preventing any similar forgetfulness in the future.  
COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSION 
 In this section I will discuss a comparison of the Sook Ching to the Cambodian Genocide, 
a discussion of success stories in genocide prevention, and my conclusion. The Cambodian 
Genocide is a good comparison because of its wider impact and more successful war crime trials. 
I bring up the issues relating to successful genocide prevention because it is not easy to determine 
what impact intervention had on a crime that never occurred. It might have been prevented due 
to this intervention, or for any myriad of other reasons. This makes studying histories such as that 
of the Sook Ching all the more important by providing context to discussions about future 
prevention.  
COMPARISON TO CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE 
The Cambodian Genocide is particularly strong as a comparative case due to its regional 
proximity. Its history has little overlap with that of the Sook Ching, but the repercussions and 
e e al c ic i  f he Kh e  R ge  leade  e  a ecede  f  he  f e dic  he S k 
Ching deserves. 
The Cambodian Genocide began in 1975, after the Khmer Rouge took power. They were a 
communist insurgent group that had been working for over a decade to gain power and named 
their regime Democratic Kampuchea (DK).152 Their origin was built atop a legacy of US bombing 
in Cambodia. Lasting from 1969 to 1973, this violence gave the communist Pol Pot and his 
followers effective anti-US propaganda and a defense for their murder of enemies.153 Killings were 
particularly violent and widely distributed; almost anyone could be perceived as an enemy of the 
state, for almost any reason.154 There were three main groups targeted: religious groups, ethnic 
and racial minority groups, and the eastern Khmers, who lived near Vietnam.155 Here, ethnic 
Chinese were again targeted. This time it was not because of their perceived dissidence but 
because of perceived laziness derived from their city dwelling.156 Of their original population of 
425,000 in 1975, only 200,000 had survived by 1979.157 
Out of a population of 8 million, approximately 1.5 million Cambodians are estimated to have 
died during this time, many from executions and many from starvation.158 Although we have 
learned much of this through oral histories, the prosecutors of the Cambodian Genocide also had 
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a bit of luck. Kang Khek Iev, often known as Deuch, oversaw the Khmer Rouge prison and 
extermination center Tuol Sleng. When the regime fell, he did not destroy the prison archives that 
documented the crimes which occurred there; instead, he made sure to murder almost all 
remaining prisoners.159 These documents formed the foundation of many arguments by the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia that investigated the genocide. This was a 
common thread throughout the Cambodian Genocide. Many top officials meticulously 
documented their actions, both out of ignorance of their coming fall and of the coming of the 
internet, which would allow their documents to be widely circulated.160 This sort of written 
documentation is perhaps the most helpful tool genocide researchers can have. Unfortunately, 
the Sook Ching has significantly less written documentation, and so I must focus more on oral 
histories.  
The Khmer Rouge was ousted by Vietnamese forces in 1979, but Pol Pot continued to lead an 
insurgent group from the Thai border until the group collapsed inward during 1996 to 1998.161 Pol 
Pot died of illness in his sleep, never facing trial for his crimes.162 Throughout this all, the United 
States and China continued to support the Khmer Rouge, and up until 1992, the United Nations 
ed P l P  egi e a d c ide ed he e iled Kh e  R ge g e e   be Ca b dia  
legitimate representatives.163 This legacy of genocide acceptance, or even denial, shows us an 
alternative of how the Cambodian Genocide could have remained in collective memory had it not 
been for institutions such as the United Nations (which improved its handling of the situation 
after 1992) and their Genocide Convention. The establishment of international courts of law is of 
huge importance for the trial of crimes of this magnitude. Wi h  he UN, Ca b dia  legi i a e 
government would have needed to face the power of both the United States and China to gain 
recognition for crimes committed. It is quite possible that these two countries could have used 
their economic and political influence to force Cambodia to do their will without ever using a 
military threat. 
Despite these difficult circumstances, the situation is improving. Infrastructure is being 
rebuilt, land mines dug up, and new professionals are getting trained. Additionally, in November 
of 2018, the United Nations-backed Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia convicted 
 f P l P  a i a  f ge cide.164 This is the first ever verdict of its kind, as the 
organization had spent years collecting evidence (and faced widespread criticism for its slow 
movement). An important point here is how long it took the UN to establish an international 
tribunal to begin hearings. They did not begin this process until 1999, a full 20 years after the 
Khmer Rouge was removed from power.165 Despite this long wait, the courts have successfully 
brought several criminals to justice. This long wait proves that the age of a crime does not make 
it ineligible for genocidal study. Although the Sook Ching is a significantly older crime, we have 
many firsthand records of what happened, along with documents from both sides of the genocide. 
The 20 years that passed before the Cambodian Genocide was officially examined by the UN 
proves that immediate action after a crime is not a prerequisite for bringing about justice.  
The most important part of these proceedings for my argument are the methods through which 
the tribunal convicted these men of genocide. Prosecutors used the same language from the 
United Nations Convention on Genocide that I have used here in my own argument, namely that 
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he Kh e  R ge had he i e   de , i  h le  i  a , a a i al, e h ic, acial  
eligi  g . 166 Thi  a  he  c b a ed b  he Kh e  R ge  a  killi g  a d 
deportations of ethnic Vietnamese, along with the ethnic Cham minority167 and ethnic Chinese 
populations. The fact that prosecutors successfully used this language to convict people of 
genocide is very valuable to my case, as it sets a precedent for historical crimes such as the Sook 
Ching Massacre.  
SUCCESS STORIES 
The importance of my research is to strengthen the precedent of genocide identification to 
prevent further crimes. The fact that the Sook Ching is an old crime does not diminish the net gain 
that would come of using it as a precedent in future preventative measures. Unfortunately, the 
very nature of genocide studies makes it difficult to identify failed genocides. Even when they have 
indisputably occurred, there tend to be deniers. As Christina Cliff, professor of political science at 
F a kli  Pie ce U i e i  a ed, [Whe ] a egi e (  g ) ha  la   c i  a ge cide 
b  e e ed b  e e al f ce [i ] i  diffic l   di ce , al h gh  c ld a g e ha  he 
NATO intervention in Libya prevented Qaddafi from mass slaughter, although whether his plans 
ld ha e bee  legall  defi ed a  ge cide i  e i able. 168 Herein lies the problem. Although 
e k  ha  NATO i e e ed  hal  Qaddafi  i ea e , e ca  de e i e i h a  
great level of certainty that his regime would have progressed to genocide. Due to this uncertainty, 
we can only say that it is possible that an intervention prevented a genocide, not that it did so 
definitively. Using historical evidence of crimes such as the Sook Ching helps us identify 
dangerous patterns, and ideally allows us to intervene early enough that no tragedy occurs. It is 
crucial to build a definition of genocide and a catalogue of examples which we can pull from to 
address future crimes.  
One of the strongest forms of genocide awareness comes from the communities that have 
formed online to keep people informed about potential and current genocides. Genocide Watch 
i  e ha  he be  k  f he e. I  eb i e fea e  a ab i led C e  Ge cide Wa ch 
Alert  ha  i f  eade  ab  e ial a ea  f ge cide a d he ld.169 Features such 
as these allow public citizens to learn about global conflicts, and demonstrate that there is some 
level of care taken by those determining whether or not to intervene in other countries. Genocide 
Watch, and other websites like it, can enhance confidence in governing bodies, along with giving 
people the information needed to make personal decisions about activism or intervention. This is 
a clear marker of improvement in public awareness about genocide. At the time of the Sook Ching, 
it would have been near impossible to spread the news of it to distant countries in any sort of 
timely manner. Since the entire crime took only twelve days, and itself only began a week after 
Japanese occupation began, it is unlikely prevention could have happened concurrently. 
Nowadays, with publicized watches going on, it will hopefully become easier to predict and 
prevent future genocides. Redefining the Sook Ching will add to the catalogue of past genocides 
and will provide evidence and information that can be used to prevent future crimes.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
I have discussed a variety of reasons that the Sook Ching should be considered a genocide 
rather than a massacre. My argument ili e  he U i ed Na i  Ge cide C e i  fi e 
qualifications for genocide, and states that because the Sook Ching fulfilled three, it should thus 
qualify as a genocide. I also give readers a background on the history of genocide studies, along 
with an in-depth history of the Sook Ching itself. This is accompanied by a series of counterpoints 
that defend the view that the Sook Ching was not a genocide, which I respond to. I then discussed 
the politics of memory on both sides of the invasion. I specifically focused on the use of war shrines 
and memorials in Singapore and wrote about how they were used by both Japan and Singapore 
to back up a political agenda. I finish with a comparison to the Cambodian Genocide and its 
similarities and differences to the Sook Ching. I will add a disclaimer here that my research is 
somewhat incomplete. Some sources I used here are tertiary because I was unable to procure more 
di ec  ce . Ha a hi  i i g ab  he S k Chi g i  a  e a le, a  I a  able  ead he 
Japanese plans myself. Finally, my argument is not merely an academic one, as I think the 
alteration of the label is important to set a precedent for future genocides. By labeling something 
like the Sook Ching a genocide, it will leave a record which we can reference in the future to bring 
justice to other mass tragedies.  
In November of 2018, the Khmer Rouge was convicted of genocide in Cambodia for their 
crimes of the 1970s.170 This ruling sets a strong precedent for genocide trials. Rather than only 
finding individuals guilty (though this is necessary as well), the government and system within 
which the genocide occurs were found guilty. I hope that this reaps benefits in the form of 
continued genocide convictions around the world, including the Sook Ching.  
History, of course, is subjective. I will end with a quote from Talaat Pasha, initiator of the 
A e ia  Ge cide: I ha e he c ic i  ha  a  l g a  a a i  d e  he best for its own 
i e e , a d cceed , he ld ad i e  i  a d hi k  i  al. 171 Perhaps if Japan had 
succeeded in conquering Southeast Asia and winning the war, the conversation we have would be 
a very different one.  
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